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JÜRGEN HABERMAS'S CRITIQUE 
OF MARXISM 
TONY FLOOD 
HABERMAS'S ASSESSMENT of Marxism consists 
of both a defense and a critique. According to Habermas, 
Marx held the key to incorporating the insights of the Ger- 
man idealistic philosophical tradition into his critique of 
Hegel's philosophy of subject-object identity, but failed to use it 
fully. In Habermas's view, Marx only partially resisted positivistic 
social theory's attack upon epistemology and consequently 
adopted a framework of sociological inquiry that actually pre- 
vents critical self-reflection, the methodological foundation of 
the theoretical recognition of the human interests in identity, 
control over nature, and emancipation. In spite of Marx's obvi- 
ous concern for the self-emancipation of the human species, his 
naturalistic theoretical framework, Habermas contends, cannot 
articulate that freedom's realization except as the automatic by- 
product of natural-historical evolution. We shall here examine 
Habermas's theory of "cognitive interests" insofar as it deter- 
mines his critique of Marxism, to which critique we shall then 
turn. I hope to show that Habermas's view of Marxism is a sym- 
pathetically critical one from which Marxists hould learn, even 
as they attempt to answer it. 
I 
Habermas's critique, which is founded upon a notion of re- 
flectively grasped cognitive interests, avoids the "circle" of every 
epistemological enterprise while simultaneously making neces- 
sary a "materialization" of epistemology. This "circle" of epis- 
temology may be understood in the following way. Consider that 
448 
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for any proposition/? and a particular epistemological criterion c, 
one may claim that "I know that/? by appeal to c" The problem 
is to determine what criterion one appeals to when p=c. Clearly, 
c is eliminated as a possibility since in this case its own truth 
happens to be in question; on the other hand, any metacriterion, 
for example c'9 shares the same difficulty as c. The application of 
a criterion of truth to itself is circular and consequently meaning- 
less, while any termination of the theoretically endless series of 
"criteria of criteria" is just as irrational. This is the substance of 
Hegel's criticism of the epistemological enterprise whose most 
famous practitioner was Immanual Kant. The whole 
justification-framework must be abandoned as wrong-headed as 
well as theoretically impossible, for, as Habermas quotes Hegel, 
what "is demanded is thus the following: we should know the 
cognitive faculty before we know. It is like wanting to swim be- 
fore going in the water. The investigation of the faculty of 
knowledge is itself knowledge and cannot arrive at its goal be- 
cause it is this goal already."1 
For Hegel, phenomenological self-reflection accomplishes 
what epistemology hopes to, but cannot, bring to pass: the estab- 
lishment of the foundation of knowledge as certain, that is, in- 
vulnerable to the attacks of unconditional doubt. Since the re- 
moval of such doubt is a process internal to the thinking subject, 
that process cannot be completed via non-subjective argumenta- 
tion. If a criterion does remove doubt, then it is already one with 
the certain knowledge that it is sought; therefore, it is meaning- 
less to refer to it as a criterion, as if to distinguish its existence 
from its object, the unassailable foundation of knowledge. 
What is this reflection, then? It is essentially a remembering 
of knowledge already in one's possession. To go through the 
motions of erecting a justification external to a given 
knowledge-claim and then to "apply" it to that claim so as to 
"verify" the latter, is to engage in self-deception. All one needs to 
do is to note the immediacy of the knowledge one is unnecessar- 
ily trying to justify. Reflection uncovers this immediacy and rec- 
ognizes it as the foundation sought. This foundation of science, 
which one can immediately grasp through phenomenological re- 
flection, is for Hegel the principle of subject-object identity. This 
1 Quoted in Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest (Boston, 1972), p. 7. 
Hereafter cited as KHI. 
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identity, or Absolute Knowledge, is a truth unrecognized by us in 
our everyday consciousness. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel 
tries to demonstrate that this identity is hidden under layers of 
consciousness which can be phenomenologically penetrated, 
starting with the pseudo-"immediacy" of Sense-Certainty. 
Our purpose here is not to travel the Phenomenology 's tortu- 
ous path from this pseudo-"immediacy" to true, subject-object 
immediacy, even if we were capable of doing so. We must instead 
focus on Habermas's retention of Hegel's concept of self- 
reflection along with his rejection of Hegel's philosophy of iden- 
tity. For Habermas, self-reflection u covers knowledge-constitutive 
interests which inhere in Reason and which are more fruitfully 
articulated within the framework of a social theory than in that 
of an absolute idealism. 
Habermas accepts Hegel's critique of epistemology without 
fully accepting what Hegel offers as a solution, just as he accepts 
Marx's critique of Hegel without fully accepting Marx's sociolog- 
ical framework. According to Habermas, Hegel never really 
demonstrates subject-object identity in his famous work, but 
rather assumes its possibility beforehand and then contrives a
literary path which "leads" one to its (pre)destination. This 
undercuts the force of Hegel's argument and compels us to look 
elsewhere for the foundations of a critical, non-positivistic social 
theory.2 
Habermas's materialism is affirmed in his criticism of 
Hegel's conception of nature as the alienation of Logic, which 
alienation is overcome in self-conscious Spirit which recognizes 
nothing outside itself. As Habermas writes (concurring with 
Marx): 
Nature cannot be conceived as the other of a mind that is at the same 
time in its own element. For if nature were mind in the state of com- 
plete externalization, then as congealed mind it would have its essence 
and life not in itself but outside itself. There would be an advance 
guarantee that in truth nature could exist only as mind reflexively 
remembers itwhile returning to itself rom nature.3 
For Habermas, as for Marx, this proposition is intolerably false: 
2 khi, p. 10. 
3 KHI, p. 25. 
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nature does not owe its existence to any stage in the development 
of Spirit. Spirit and mind are always human spirit and mind, and 
insofar as humanity has a natural origin, nature must precede 
mind - logically as well as chronologically - as mind's "absolute 
ground."4 Thus, "the seal placed on absolute knowledge by the 
philosophy of identity is broken if the externality of na- 
ture . . . not only seems external to a consciousness that finds 
itself within nature but refers instead to the immediacy of a 
substratum on which the mind contingently depends."5 
Thus Habermas has difficulties with both ends of the spec- 
trum from Kant to Hegel. But as we shall see, the insights gained 
from his study of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel lead Habermas to the 
conclusion that Marx failed to present enough of the sociological 
picture: according to Habermas, Marx overreacted to Hegel's 
dialectics of interaction, even though the latter are themselves 
the product of a philosophical one-sidedness and are embedded 
in an idealism rejected by both Marx and Habermas. In Haber- 
mas's view, Marx contributed an indispensable part - perhaps 
the more important part - of the picture through his dialectics of 
labor, and for this we owe him much. But insofar as Marx pre- 
sented his partial truth as the whole truth, it must be corrected to 
account for a feature of human existence which claims a status 
equal to that of labor. We shall return to Habermas's criticism of 
Marx after examining the former's categories of knowledge- 
constitutive interests. 
By "interests," Habermas means "the basic orientations 
rooted in specific fundamental conditions of the possible repro- 
duction and self-constitution f the human species, namely work 
and interaction .... Knowledge-constitutive interest can be de- 
scribed exclusively as a function of the objectively constituted 
problems of the preservation of life that have been solved by the 
cultural forms of existence as such."6 Already we may note that 
Habermas has not one but two categories articulating conditions 
of human existence, namely, "reproduction and self- 
constitution," which respectively are referred to by "work and 
interaction." 
In this view, knowing does not occur outside the context of 
' khi, p. 25. 
5 KHI, p. 26. 
5 KHI, p. 196. 
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society: knowledge is constituted by the interests that are gener- 
ated by the above-mentioned "fundamental conditions" of 
human existence. Human beings have two basic orientations that 
determine their survival and development, one toward nature 
and another toward each other. While these two orientations or 
interests are internally related to each other, and though the 
activities each generates together form a unity in what Habermas 
calls "material synthesis," they must remain distinguishable at the 
level of socio-historical investigation. A closer look at these two 
interests is now in order. 
The technical cognitive interest (TCI) may be referred to as the 
interest in control over natural processes. The relationship of 
man to nature is logically invariant and is well-articulated in the 
dictum of Francis Bacon that nature, to be commanded, must 
first be obeyed. The human species empirically accumulates and 
rationally organizes information into laws from which can be 
derived technical rules whose employment extends human control 
over nature. TCI's operate in what Habermas calls systems of 
purposive-rational (instrumental and strategic) action (PRAS's). 
The man-nature relationship is essentially a means-ends affair in 
which nature is transformed instrumentally, i.e., to realize cer- 
tain human ends. Human beings approach their natural envi- 
ronment monologically: nature is not "consulted" about what is 
done to it or said about it. The TCI is also referred to by 
Habermas as the Kantian moment of material synthesis. 
The practical cognitive interest (PCI) may be referred to as the 
interest in identity. Human beings do not simply relate to nature: 
they must relate to each other in a definite fashion. They have a 
conception of themselves that they retain in their practical con- 
duct and which partially determines this conduct, e.g., what is 
undertaken in PRAS's. Human beings expect certain behavior 
from each other, not just from nature. These mutual expecta- 
tions are articulated in intersubjectively shared ordinary lan- 
guage in the form of social norms which govern what Habermas 
calls symbolic (communicative) interaction systems (SIS's). These 
systems refer to the various ways human beings practically or- 
ganize themselves to achieve social ends. The self-conception of 
the social subjects determines how they deal with nature, their 
object. In organizing themselves, human beings become their 
own objects; but owing to their subjectivity, they cannot really 
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treat themselves like the objectified processes of nature. In other 
words, while PRAS's entail a subject-object relation that is 
monologic in character, SIS's entail a subject-object relation that 
is really a subject-subject relation which is necessarily dialogic in 
nature: the "object" (really, human subjects) has a say about what 
is done to "it" or said about "it"; if it does not have such a say the 
subject matter has been entirely misunderstood. Insofar as SIS's 
do not involve a deference to the object (as in PRAS's), but 
rather a positing of the subject itself, Habermas refers to the PCI 
as the Fichtean moment of material synthesis. 
The TCI and the PCI form a dialectical unity in material 
synthesis which as a whole is guided by the more general human 
interest in autonomy and responsibility, or in a word, freedom. 
This interest in overcoming domination by both nature and by 
fellow human beings underlies PRAS's and SIS's, while each of 
these systems is guided by its own cognitive interest. This over- 
arching knowledge-constitutive interest is what Habermas calls 
the emancipatory cognitive interest (abbreviated hereafter as 
ECI); it is the Hegelian moment unifying the other two. The ECI 
is the life-line of Reason: Reason inheres in the interest in free- 
dom.7 Reason "lives" in the reflexive remembering which draws 
out the transcendental aspects of human existence (the TCI and 
the PCI). To quote Habermas: 
[In] the experience of the emancipatory power of reflection, . . . the 
subject . . . becomes transparent to itself in the history of its genesis. 
Methodically it leads to a standpoint from which the identity of reason 
with the will to reason freely arises. In self-reflection, k owledge for 
the sake of knowledge comes to coincide with the interest in autonomy 
and responsibility. For the pursuit of reflection knows itself as a mo- 
ment of emancipation. Reason is at the same time subject to the interest 
in reason. We can say that it obeys an emancipatory cognitive interest, 
which aims at the pursuit of reflection.8 
Freedom is both striven for and known: it is neither effortlessly 
nor unconsciously acquired and enjoyed. Freedom as a condition 
of human existence marked by autonomy and responsibility is a 
goal which is at once an object of theory and practice. The inter- 
est in freedom is thus an inseverable bond of theory and prac- 
tice. 
7 KHI, p. 152. 
8 KHI, pp. 197-98. 
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Habermas takes these explicitly Hegelian themes of freedom 
and reason very seriously, but secures them within a materialistic 
critique of Hegel's philosophy of subject-object identity and of 
Hegel's theoretical treatment of nature as the alienation of mind. 
While Marx, Habermas acknowledges, was the first to provide 
the basis of a non-idealistic rendering of Hegel's insights into 
social reality, Marx unfortunately overreacted to Hegel's dialec- 
tics of the interaction between consciousnesses. In Habermas's 
view, Marx, in his justified rejection of Hegel's absolute idealism, 
nonetheless cut himself off from what must be preserved, even if 
transformed. He replaced one one-sidedness with another: he 
attempted to let man's invariant relation to nature, rather than 
intersubjective interaction, tell the whole story. Habermas be- 
lieves we must reassess Marx's contributions to identify and 
criticize those elements in his writings which have given rise to 
positivistic misinterpretations of his more dialectical intentions. 
II 
In his essay, "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's 
Jena Philosophy ofMind,"9 Habermas argues that Hegel once held 
labor to be a constitutive moment of developing Spirit along with 
language and interaction (action based on mutual expectation), 
but later abandoned this perspective. From about the time he 
wrote the Phenomenology (1806) until his death, Hegel maintained 
a philosophy of Spirit which subordinated language to a media- 
tion of imagination and memory within "subjective spirit," while 
labor as instrumental ction disappears entirely. Social labor is 
dealt with under the rubric "systems of needs" within "objective 
spirit," which is manifested in the realm of law and politics.10 But 
because of the truth of a proposition recognized in his earlier 
system, namely (as Habermas puts it), that "[instrumental ction, 
at least when solitary, is monologic action,"11 Hegel later faced 
the difficulty of expressing such action within his philosophy of 
universal interaction. Labor as social labor, as need-satisfaction, 
as a system of intersubjective cooperation, fits easily within such 
9 This appears in Habermas's book, Theory and Practice (Boston, 1974), pp. 142-69. 
Hereafter cited as TAP. 
10 TAP, p. 162. 
11 TAP, p. 159. 
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a philosophy; but this is simply not true for labor as instrumental 
action, as a relation between subject and a non-subject (nature). 
As Marx wrote, the externality of nature was for Hegel "an 
alienation, a fault, a weakness that should not exist."12 Hegel 
attempted to "eliminate" this weakness by conceiving nature not 
merely as object (Gegenstand), but as adversary (Gegenspieler) as 
well. 
Instrumental activity upon nature is not a problem if nature 
is not an externality at all, but an alienation. Alienation can occur 
only within and for a consciousness which merely appears to 
itself as something external to itself. In Hegel's Encyclopedia ofthe 
Philosophical Sciences, sec. 384, Habermas finds that the "manifest- 
ing which ... is the becoming of nature, as the manifesting of 
spirit, which is free [in history], is the positing of nature as the 
spirit's world; a positing which as reflection is at the same time a 
prepositing of the world as independent nature."13 We may recall 
our earlier discussion of Habermas's and Marx's criticisms of 
Hegel's conception of a nature which exists only insofar as Spirit 
"reflexively remembers" it. We can now see that Hegel needed 
this patently untenable notion in order to be able to apply his 
principle of interaction universally. Hegel was able to deal with 
labor only if he first reduced it to interaction, to a struggle for 
recognition. Habermas explains that if 
hidden subjectivity can always be found in what has been objectivized, 
if behind the masks of objects, nature can always be revealed as the 
concealed partner, then the basic dialectical patterns of representation 
[i. e., language - T.F.] and labor can also be reduced to one common 
denominator with the dialectics of moral action [i.e., interaction - T.F.]. 
For then the relationship of the name-giving and the working subject 
can also be brought within the configuration of reciprocal recogni- 
tion.14 
Nature is thus conceived as an object "with which interaction in 
the mode of that between subjects is possible."15 Therefore, if 
12 Quoted in KHI, p. 26. 
13 Quoted in TAP, p. 163, substituting "prepositing," the translator's parenthetical, but 
literal and clearer, rendering of Voraussetzen for his actual, but somewhat misleading, 
choice, "presupposing." 
14 TAP, p. 163. 
15 Ibid. 
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nature is alienated Spirit, then the goal "is not the appropriation of 
what has been objectified, but instead the reconciliation, the resto- 
ration of the friendliness which has been destroyed."16 
For Habermas, as for the younger Hegel, labor and interac- 
tion are heterogenous, irreducible to each other. This 
heterogeneity, as Habermas sees it, is the basis for rejecting both 
Hegel's and Marx's theoretical frameworks. Hegel elevates na- 
ture to the status of subject, the Other of Spirit, But Spirit is 
everything: between Spirit and its illusory Other, neither interac- 
tion nor communication is possible as either of them are possible 
between finite subjects, for "absolute spirit is solitary."17 Thus, in 
attempting to universalize interaction, Hegel destroys it at the 
level of Absolute Spirit. On the other hand, a purely external 
nature is just as disastrous for his philosophy of identity. The 
human species' instrumental, monologic relationship to nature 
asserts itself in the face of Hegel's attempt to dissolve it or ignore 
it in his system. 
This truth, however, is still only part of the story, and any 
attempt, such as Marx's, to extend it to the social totality in its 
entirety is wrong, in Habermas's view. It leads to errors that are 
perhaps more "persuasive" - and therefore more difficult to 
overcome - than those that follow from Hegel's opposite one- 
sideness with its resultant counter-intuitive idealism. However, 
Habermas's critique of Marxism is nonetheless Hegelian insofar 
as it places the dialectics of interaction next to Marx's dialectics 
of labor. We trust that we have already shown that Habermas is 
not interested in initiating an uncritical "back to Hegel" move- 
ment, but Habermas nonetheless believes that Hegel's insights 
into the interactional dimension of human beings should not be 
thrown out with the philosophy of identity. 
We must here note Habermas's sympathy with Marx's at- 
tempt to ground a critical social theory without succumbing to 
either Hegel's idealism or to the then emergent positivistic attack 
upon philosophy. Habermas declares that 
with Hegel ... a fatal misunderstanding arises: the idea that the claim 
asserted by philosophical reason against the abstract thought of mere 
16 TAP, p. 164. 
17 Ibid. 
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understanding is equivalent to the usurpation of the legitimacy of in- 
dependent sciences by a philosophy claiming to retain its position as 
universal scientific knowledge. But the actual fact of scientific progress 
independent of philosophy had to unmask this claim, however misun- 
derstood, as bare fiction. It was this that served as the foundation-stone of
positivism. Only Marx could have contested its victory. For he pursued 
Hegel's critique of Kant without sharing the basic assumption of the 
philosophy of identity that hindered Hegel from unambiguously 
radicalizing the critique of knowledge.18 
Habermas's disagreement with Marx is over the categorical 
framework Marx employed in his investigations, a framework 
which "proves itself insufficient to establish an unconditional 
phenomenological self-reflection fknowledge and thus prevent 
the positivist atrophy of epistemology. Considered immanently, I 
see the reason for this in the reduction of the self- generativ e act of the 
human species to labor"19 
Habermas does point out that Marx "rediscovered that in- 
terconnection between labor and interaction in the dialectic of 
the forces of production and the relations of production."20 In- 
deed, in Marx's concrete investigations one will find the 
categories "of material activity and revolutionary practice, of 
labor and reflection at once."21 But, Habermas insists, "Marx 
interprets what he does in the more restricted conception of the 
species self-reflection through work alone."22 Thus, while Marx 
contributes to the true radicalization of the critique of knowledge 
and actually surpasses the Hegelian viewpoint, he nonetheless 
articulates this achievement in terms that allow a positivistic mis- 
reading of his own works: 
. . . [F]or Marx, instrumental action, the productive activity which regu- 
lates the material interchange of the human species with its natural 
environment, becomes the paradigm for the generation of all the 
categories; everything is resolved into the self-movement of produc- 
tion. Because of this, Marx's brilliant insight into the dialectical rela- 
18 KHI, p. 24; my emphasis. 
19 KHI, p. 42. 
20 TAP, p. 168. 
21 KHI, p. 42. 
22 KHI, p. 42; my emphasis. 
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tionship between the forces or production and the relations of produc- 
tion could very quickly be misinterpreted in a mechanistic manner.23 
A mechanistic interpretation would be one that claims that 
human evolution is an automatic process whose driving force is 
the accumulation of technically exploitable knowledge and which 
results in the eventual displacement of all necessary labor by 
machine. In such a view, the object of social science is essentially 
no different from that of natural science: knowledge in both 
cases simply involves the accumulation, organization, and in- 
terpretation of empirical data; a theory of knowledge is entirely 
unnecessary. Human history, here, is viewed as an outgrowth of 
natural history. The human species' interactional dimension, 
wherein lies the species' specific difference (along with labor) 
from the rest of the animal kingdom, is lost in this view. 
As a result, human self-comprehension becomes logically 
impossible because such comprehension operates at the level of 
interaction. This is precisely the positivist's conclusion: social sci- 
ence is practically impossible due to the complexity of the data. 
Positivism does not see the object of social science on its own 
terms, but rather as an unmanageable variant of the "familiar" 
object of natural science. The monologic relationship between 
the subject and the object is not questioned even when the object 
is neither the solar system nor molecules, but rather the class of 
subjects themselves, the human species. Positivism does not view 
the possibility of social theory as critique, as the critical self- 
reflection of social subjects. 
Positivism, as Trent Schroyer defined it in his exposition of 
Habermas's thought, "is that conception of knowledge which de- 
nies the possibility of reflective reconstruction of the transcen- 
dental principles presupposed in human activity."24 In such a 
methodological framework there is no room for critical self- 
reflection or, more significantly, for the revolutionary proleta- 
rian class consciousness Marx saw as a prerequisite for the over- 
throw of capitalism. Habermas is convinced that these positivistic 
elements pervade Marx's conception of what he was doing, but 
also that they contradict he thrust of his work. This work is 
23 TAP, p. 169. 
24 Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination (New York, 1973), p. 114. 
This content downloaded from 140.251.195.169 on Wed, 22 Jan 2014 14:14:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HABERMAS ON MARX 459 
certainly, despite the lack of adequate self-comprehension, an 
important attempt to develop a non-positivistic social theory. 
Therefore, if the "transcendental principles presupposed in 
human activity"25 can in fact be reflexively reconstructed - and 
Habermas's theory of cognitive interests tries to reconstruct 
them - then positivism can be refuted and Marxism's self- 
comprehension can be brought in line with its actual scientific 
contribution. We shall now take a closer look at Habermas's ac- 
count of this self-comprehension. 
Ill 
Habermas claimed that Marx developed implicitly a notion 
of material synthesis (or a materialistic notion of synthesis) which 
he opposed to the idealistic synthesis as developed by Kant, 
Fichte, and Hegel. For Marx, the self-reflection fconsciousness 
discloses the structure of social labor as that which synthesizes 
subject and object. Rejecting Hegel's assumption of subject-object 
identity, Marx "does not view nature under the category of 
another subject, but conversely the subject under the category of 
another nature."26 Unlike idealistic synthesis, material synthesis 
neither generates a logical structure, nor is it absolute: human 
labor, rather than transcendental consciousness, is the synthetic 
agent by which a socio-economic structure is constituted; and 
since the subject-object relation is historically determined and 
does not form an identity, it is not absolute.27 
We should recall from our earlier discussion of cognitive 
interests that Habermas claims that there are two basic orienta- 
tions of knowledge-constitutive interests which direct human ac- 
tivity: the TCI (Kantian moment) and the PCI (Fichtean mo- 
ment). Habermas's critique of Marx amounts to the charge that 
Marx reproduces both moments of material synthesis, but re- 
duces the PCI to a function of the TCI, thereby actually abolish- 
ing the former as a distinct, irreducible moment. 
The Kantian moment reappears in Marx as the "invariant 
25 Ibid., p. 115. 
26 KHI, p. 32. 
27 KHI, pp. 31, 32. 
28 KHI, p. 35. 
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relation of the species to the natural environment, which is estab- 
lished by the behaviorial system of instrumental action - for 
labor processes are the 'perpetual natural necessity of human 
life' [Marx]." Also, the Kantian noumenon or unknowable thing- 
in-itself also reappears in Marx's conception of nature. As 
Habermas explains Marx's position: "No matter how far our 
power of technical control over nature is extended, nature re- 
tains a substantial core that does not reveal itself to us."29 Labor 
may determine how nature is relativized to human beings in any 
epoch, "but it does not eliminate the independence of its [na- 
ture's] existence."30 The prior existence of the world is presup- 
posed in productive activity, though "we ourselves have access to 
nature only within the historical dimension disclosed by labor 
processes."31 This essentially Kantian thrust corrects "the idealist 
attempt to reduce nature to a mere externalization of mind 
[and] . . . preserves nature's immovable facticity despite nature's 
historical embeddedness in the universal structures of mediation 
constituted by laboring subjects."32 
What labor does - and in doing so it parallels the activity of 
the Kantian transcendental ego - is to give form to préexistent 
"raw material." The Kantian subject can know only phenomena: 
the "things-in-themselves," the things as they are apart from any 
experiential relation to a subject, pose no epistemological question 
and therefore, in principle, cannot be known. Similarly, in "his 
production," Marx wrote, "man can only proceed like nature 
herself, that is only by changing the forms of substances"** The dif- 
ference between Kant and Marx is that whereas Kant's cognitive 
process involves a logically unalterable set of categories that or- 
ganize experience, Marx's labor process transforms nature ac- 
cording to historically alterable technical rules; whereas Kant's 
subject is never among the objects it structures, Marx's subject is 
always in the process of being formed, not only directly by its 
own activity, but also by the environment i has a hand in form- 
ing. 
The Fichtean moment receives an odd treatment in Marx's 
29 KHI, p. 33. 
30 Ibid. 
31 KHI, p. 35. 
32 KHI, p. 34. 
33 Quoted in KHI, pp. 34-35. 
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framework: it virtually becomes an aspect of the Kantian mo- 
ment. Consider this succinct and representative statement by 
Fichte: "In thinking of your present self-positing, which has been 
elevated to clear consciousness, you must conceive of another 
such positing having preceded it without clear consciousness; the 
present one refers to the latter and is conditioned by it."34 Marx's 
materialism appropriates this conception as follows, according to 
Habermas: the social totality of laboring subjects confronts na- 
ture as an ego confronts a non-ego. Yet preexisting nature ob- 
tains its identity only through labor processes. As the labor pro- 
cess alters nature in time, thereby bringing about a change in 
itself, the laboring subjects themselves change; their identity 
therefore changes: 
Each generation gains its identity only via a nature that has already 
been formed in history, and this nature in turn is the object of its labor. 
The system of social labor is always the result of the labor of past 
generations .... The present subject has in some sense been "posited" 
by the totality of preceeding subjects, that is placed in a position to 
come to grips with nature at its historically determined level. Yet it 
cannot regard this totality as an alien subject. For the labor processes 
through which it [i.e., the totality of preceding subjects - T.F.] has been 
constituted themselves belong to the very same production in which it 
[i.e., the present subject - T.F.] is engaged and which it is merely carry- 
ing forward. In its labor the present subject comprehends itself by know- 
ing itself to have been produced as by itself through the production of 
past subjects.35 
For Marx, therefore, social identity is an achievement of labor: 
the species posits itself and thereby forms itself only in the pro- 
cess of transforming nature. Marx does not view the interest in 
social identity as a relatively autonomous human dimension, but 
rather relegates it to a subordinate aspect of the interest in con- 
trol over nature. In Marx's writings, Habermas argues, one finds 
that the "absolute ego of social production is founded in a his- 
tory of nature that brings about the tool-making animal as a 
result."36 Marx himself declared that human beings "begin to 
34 Quoted in KHI, p. 38. 
35 KHI, p. 39; correcting translator's ungrammatical "labor processes . . . itself [sic] be- 
long  
" 
36 KHI, p. 41. 
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distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to 
produce their means of subsistence, a step that is conditioned by 
their bodily organization" and that the "first state of affairs of 
which to take note is therefore the bodily organization of these 
individuals and the relation it sets up between them and the rest 
of nature."37 In other words, what is distinct about the human 
species is - above all, if not solely - its instrumental relation to 
nature. 
Here Habermas differs with Marx. For Habermas, the 
human species' interests in identity and control over nature are 
coequal and distinct aspects of the species' self-generative act. If 
what Marx claimed on this point were literally true, Marx's own 
critique of mystificatory ideology would be incomprehensible be- 
cause that critique by no means logically follows from the con- 
cept of capitalist production. It can only be comprehended as an 
instance of human self-comprehension which, as we have at- 
tempted to argue earlier in this paper, must be brought under 
the categorical framework of symbolic interaction. By restricting 
himself to the categorical framework of instrumental action, 
Marx is forced to misconceive his own critique as natural science. 
Besides considering, for example, "the economic law of modern 
society" as a "natural law," he significantly quotes at length and 
with clear approval a Russian reviewer's assessment of his 
method as it is employed in Capital: the one aim of that book, the 
reviewer states, is "to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the 
necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, 
and to establish as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him 
for fundamental starting points .... Marx treats the social 
movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only 
independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but 
rather on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and 
intelligence."39 Thus had positivism influenced this great revolu- 
tionary's notions of what constitutes founded knowledge of social 
relations: Marx's critique of the reifications of capitalism is defec- 
tive at the level of self-comprehension. 
Habermas's position is that the species regenerates itself 
37 Quoted in KHI, p. 41. 
38 Quoted in KHI, p. 45. 
39 Quoted in KHI, p. 46; substituting the standard Moore and Aveling translation of 
Capital (New York, 1967), Vol. I, p. 18; my emphasis. 
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through productive labor, but forms itself through a Hegelian- 
like, intersubjective "struggle for recognition." This interactional 
dimension that Habermas wishes to recover takes the form of the 
class struggle in modern, i.e., capitalist, societies. In his view the 
class struggle is not confined to an institutionalized power strug- 
gle over the distribution of surplus value, a direct function of the 
production process. Rather, it is the arena of intersubjective rela- 
tions in which conflicting self-conceptions, most of them illusory, 
confront and test each other. New technologies can free human 
beings from necessary labor, i.e., the domination of nature, only 
if human beings first overcome the domination they impose 
upon themselves in class-divided societies. Productive knowledge 
cannot substitute for the self-reflective knowledge people need. 
The distinct processes which result in these two different kinds 
of knowledge, though interdependent, "do not converge .... 
Marx tried in vain to capture this [relative autonomy - T.F.] in 
the dialectic of the forces of production and relations of produc- 
tion. In vain - for the meaning of this 'dialectic' must remain 
unclarified as long as the materialist concept of the synthesis of 
man and nature is restricted to the categorical framework of 
production."40 Again, the emphasis .should be on the words 
"categorical framework": Habermas recognizes that at "the level of 
his material investigations, . . . Marx always takes account of social 
practice that encompasses both work and interaction."41 
Habermas claims that Marx has shown, in his substantive 
analyses of capitalist society, that the class struggle does not pri- 
marily take the form of brute force but rather of ideological 
delusion: products of labor do not appear as social relations be- 
tween people, but as physical, quantifiable relations between 
things. The commodification of human labor, Habermas writes, 
"makes the object of conflict unrecognizable" for capitalists and 
workers alike; this process "conceals and expresses the suppres- 
sion of an unconstrained dialogic relation."42 This objective illu- 
sion and the overcoming of it by social subjects through critique 
are simply not comprehensible as merely the ideational "feed- 
back" of the production process. 
40 KHI, p. 55, substituting "categorical" for the text's "categorial" in keeping with this 
paper's terminology. 
41 KHI, p. 53. 
42 KHI, p. 59. 
This content downloaded from 140.251.195.169 on Wed, 22 Jan 2014 14:14:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
464 SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 
As a corrective for Marxism, Habermas suggests a "recon- 
struction of the manifestations ofthe consciousness of classes" - a 
sort of materialistic Phenomenology of Spirit - to be given the same 
attention as is given to the tracing out of the development of 
modes of production if the methodological foundations of criti- 
cal social theory are to be articulated.43 Only methodological par- 
ity between the categories "production" and "interaction" pro- 
vides the possibility of a dialectical theory of the relation between 
the so-called "base" and "superstructure," which Habermas re- 
conceptualizes as PRAS's and SIS's. Such a revision should also 
reduce the occurrence of mechanistic treatments of the relation- 
ship between these two systems in actual studies, since such mis- 
treatments would be in direct conflict with the methodological 
assumptions. Truly dialectical studies of social reality could then 
be grounded as such, and not simply declared to be dialectical in 
the face of presuppositions that do not allow dialectical conclu- 
sions to follow. 
Finally, Habermas's argument, if it is to be accepted, carries 
with it implications for the history of Marxism. "Vulgar Marxist" 
errors of the past century and a quarter may owe more to a 
misreading of Marx's overall argument than of some of his texts. 
A closer examination of the supposedly misrepresentative 
"mechanistic" reading of Marx attributed by many to Engels, 
Lenin, and Stalin may indicate a greater fidelity to the letter of 
Marx than the former's accusers have allowed - although this 
may as well indicate certain unclarities in Marx's thought itself, 
as Habermas's critique suggests. 
New York City 
43 See KHI, pp. 60-62. 
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